

A Study of the Context(s) in a Specific Type of Texts: Car Accident Reports

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Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of defining context, and more specifically the different contexts needed for understanding a particular type of texts. The corpus chosen is homogeneous and allows us to determine characteristic properties of the texts from which certain inferences can be drawn by the reader. These characteristic properties come from the real world domain (K-context), the type of events the texts describe (F-context) and the genre of the texts (E-context). Together, these three contexts provide elements for the resolution of anaphoric expressions and for several types of disambiguation. We show in particular that the argumentation aspect of these texts is an essential part of the context and explains some of the inferences that can be drawn.

1 Introduction

We must first emphasize that our objectives in this paper are not general considerations about context or the theory of context, but that they are guided by the particular goals of a specific project. The work reported here is the result of a study done within a larger project on the “Semantics of Natural Languages”, viewed from the fields of Artificial Intelligence and Computational Linguistics, in which we are treating a corpus of real texts. The corpus consists of a number of insurance claim reports for car accidents.¹ This corpus offers a number of advantages, the main one being its unity, with respect to a) the domain involved (which is relatively circumscribed) and b) the conditions of enunciation (which are almost always the same). Indeed, the texts are written

after an accident and their quasi-institutional nature imposes a number of constraints on their production and, in a symmetric way, on their interpretation. This allows us to focus on the characteristic properties of the type of the texts, and to draw inferences from them.

We can then better define the notion of context and answer the following questions, which are those we address more specifically in this paper:

- In which way does context affect interpretation of NL utterances and texts?
- Which aspects of context or which contexts result in refined, more general, and different interpretations of NL?
- What is context?
- How many contexts are there?

2 The Contexts of the Corpus

All the texts are written in similar circumstances and belong to a culturally well-defined genre which both writer and reader are perfectly aware of when writing or reading one of them. An insurance claim report for a car accident is not a newspaper story, nor a letter to a friend narrating the accident, but an almost institutionalized document which obeys certain constraints concerning its content as well as its form. As emphasized by Rastier in [Rastier et al., 1994], genre constraints play a major role in the interpretation process. In order to describe these constraints, we distinguish three types of contexts, which we refer to as:

- **K-context** (knowledge context): This is what is usually meant by “context” and it refers to the extra-linguistic knowledge for the particular domain of the texts. In this case, our K-context is that of the world of road traffic, and it concerns vehicles, vehicle motions, traffic rules, the usual behavior of drivers and pedestrians, as well as their expectations, and also some elements of “naïve” geometry.
- **F-context** (factual context): For this type of texts, there are two factual constraints bearing on the content of the text:

¹ The project *Sémantiques des Langues Naturelles*, sponsored by the French Ministère de la Recherche and the CNRS, involves a number of research centers and university laboratories [Gsem, 1990a], [Estival & Gayral, 1994]. The texts were provided by the French insurance company MAIF, after being made anonymous. They have been translated into English by D.E.

- the text is a narration in which an accident takes place;
- the text involves at least two participants, generally two vehicles, one of which is the author's.
- **E-context** (context of the enunciation): The conditions of enunciation (the **discourse constraints**) for those texts are:
 - an imposed format: Before writing their text, the authors must check some boxes on the insurance claim form. These boxes are labelled with ready-made expressions and phrases which influence the vocabulary that is then used in the running text (terms such as *vehicle*, or the use of the labels “A” and “B” for each of the protagonists). On the insurance claim form, the space in which the author can write this text is pre-defined. It is rather small and thus the text must be rather short, at most one paragraph.
 - known addressee: The recipient of the text is known, it is the insurance company. Thus the argumentative aspect of the text is also known in advance: the authors of the texts will try to lessen their responsibility.

We will show how these three context types are used by the authors to write their texts and symmetrically by the readers to interpret them. These two symmetrical tasks are both composed of a factual and an argumentative part, which coincide with the two goals we can define for an NLP approach to both understanding and processing these texts. One of these goals is the factual analysis which is necessary to recreate the event: “What happened? What real world events concerning the motions of these vehicles or the scene geometry actually occurred?”.² The other is an argumentative analysis which takes into account the nature and intent of the text in order to uncover the argumentative devices used by the writer.

Although we can thus clearly delineate these two goals, they may not be so neatly separated in practice and we find that, in real text processing, they are intertwined in such a way that solving one level of analysis requires elements from the other. Similarly, although the division of context into three context types is extremely useful and revealing, we sometimes have to invoke more than one of them to treat some aspects of our texts. Nevertheless, we organize the remainder of this paper along the way these three context types can be used to describe the processes necessary for both the production and interpretation of our texts.

² We [Estival & Gayral, 1994] take an approach close to that of [Barwise, 1988], where the notation “ $P = C_{LC}(T, c)$ ” denotes the informative content P of the text T used in circumstances c , with the language conventions LC shared by all the participants.

3 The three types of Contexts

Whereas E-context and F-context are particular to this type of texts, K-context is independent of the type of texts: the knowledge involved will be the same whether the text is an accident report or a newspaper article and any text dealing with the road domain will invoke the same K-context.

3.1 K-context

K-context can be taken as the domain ontology for these texts. It is already well-established that domain ontology is necessary for natural language understanding and that purely linguistic knowledge is not sufficient. In our texts, K-context includes knowledge about the Rules of the Road, about driving, and the typical knowledge about the objects evoked and their relations with each other, hierarchical or otherwise. This knowledge is shared by the writer (W) and the reader (R) and it is used by the reader in a number of specific tasks, in particular to solve anaphors and to make inferences.

3.1.1 Rules of the Road

In these texts, the vehicles are supposed to be moving in a space which is regulated by the French traffic rules (*Code de la route*) and the drivers are supposed to obey those rules. For instance, we can see how knowledge about stop-signs is used when we examine the reasoning which must be made by the reader of (1) to reconstruct the scene (two vehicles, with their right blinker on, are stopped in front of the writer's at a stop-sign).

(1) *I was at a stop-sign with two cars in front of me turning to the right towards Mours. While the first car was going through this stop-sign I performed my check to the left and started but I hit the second car which hadn't yet gone through the stop-sign* (A1)

First, the knowledge that “Drivers must stop at a stop-sign.” is useful to infer that the interpretation for *I was at a stop-sign* here is clearly *I was stopped at a stop-sign*, although the verb *to be* in the past tense (an imperfect in the original text) followed by a locative adverbial does not necessarily entail that its subject is stopped; indeed, one can say *I was on the highway* without implying that one was not moving.

Second, the reader uses the rule “If X is at a stop-sign and X has switched his right blinker on, X will turn right” to interpret *with two cars in front of me turning to the right* as “The two cars were stopped and had switched their right blinker on” rather than “The two cars were turning right”, an interpretation which the present participle would allow. This interpretation requires some reasoning which is very difficult to automate in a computer program. Indeed, since W says that the two vehicles were turning right while in fact they were stopped, the expression *turning right* proves to be

only an intention: the cars were stopped but they were “going to turn right”. If this intention had remained in the mind of the driver, it would have been opaque to *W*, therefore an element expressing it must have been visible and perceived by *W*: the right blinker.

Third, the sentence *I performed my check to the left* is correctly understood by *R* because *W* and *R* both know what actions are expected at a stop-sign through the stereotyped knowledge or **script** [Schank & Abelson, 1977] for “X being at a stop-sign”: it implies both that X will not stay at this stop-sign and that, in order to go through it, X must check the road for safety, i.e. check that no vehicle is coming.

Drivers also know what they must do in case of an accident: they should fill in a car accident report, sign it, get it signed by the other driver(s) (and witnesses if any) involved, and send it to their insurance company. In (2), several linguistic elements can only be understood through the knowledge of what is expected in that situation.

(2) *Heavy traffic on Bd Sébastopol. I was driving between two lanes of stopped cars when one of the cars on my left opened its right front door. To avoid it, I swerved, which made me touch vehicle B with the rear of my motorcycle, which made me fall. Because of the heavy traffic that day, we only exchanged our insurance companies and names which explains why the report is only signed by me.* (A3)

The second relative pronoun *which* refers not to the fact of having exchanged insurance information and names, but to the fact that this is all that happened, while much more would have been expected from the accident script: i.e. get the report form, check the appropriate boxes, make the drawing, write the report, and sign it. The word *only* (*juste* in the French text) signals that something is missing, that there is a deviation with respect to the situation expected from the K-context. The relative pronoun thus refers to what is actually missing from the reported scene, but which would have been implied otherwise.

3.1.2 Typicality

Typicality can first be considered at the lexical level. Indeed, any domain ontology induces certain preferences for the interpretation of lexical items which may have several meanings, and there are examples in our texts where lexical typicality helps resolve polysemy (which may not even be noticed by a human reader, but would cause problems in machine processing).

For example, in the phrase *je roulais* which occurs very often in our texts, e.g. in (3), the verb *rouler* must be interpreted as “to travel by means of a vehicle with wheels” rather than as “to roll” (as in *Paul roule dans le sable/ Paul rolls in the sand*) because the K-context

makes it improbable that a text describing a car accident would talk about somebody rolling in the second sense.

(3) *Je roulais sur la partie droite de la chaussée quand un véhicule arrivant en face dans le virage a été complètement déporté. Serrant à droite au maximum, je n'ai pu éviter la voiture qui arrivait à grande vitesse.*

I was driving on the right hand side of the road when a vehicle arriving in front of me in the curve was completely thrown off course. Keeping as close as possible to the right, I wasn't able to avoid the car which was coming with great speed. (A8)

The notion of typicality (relative to a domain or a context) also concerns the knowledge of which entities are considered typical in that context. This is crucial for determining what the entities mentioned in a text are, and can also be illustrated with (3), where *R* must determine that the two different expressions *a vehicle arriving in front of me in the curve* and *the car which was coming with great speed* are co-referent and thus that the text only involves two vehicles.

First, the two terms being used, *vehicle* and *car*, are compatible, indeed a car is a particular type of vehicle. This fact can be extracted from a hierarchy of concepts which is part of K-context. Second, in Western industrialized countries the most typical vehicle is a car, so without any other indication a vehicle is inferred to be, typically or by default, a car.³ In (3), since *W* first uses the word *vehicle* to introduce an object, *R* infers that this vehicle is a car; this default conclusion is confirmed by the next expression *the car which was coming with great speed*.

The way *R* uses this **Typicality Rule** can be illustrated with the end of (2). As usual, the expression *I was driving* implicitly introduces a vehicle, which is by default a typical one, i.e. a car. *R* thus starts building a representation for the scene with a car as *W*'s vehicle until the expression *with the rear of my motorcycle* forces him to reconsider his previous interpretation of *I was driving* as *I was driving a car*. Moreover, *R* must then also reconsider the meaning of *between two lanes of stopped cars*, in particular the actual width of space associated with that expression. The first interpretation induces a representation where there are three car lanes and vehicle A is in the middle one (which is moving), while the second interpretation leads to the correct spatial representation, where there are only two car lanes and vehicle A is between them.

³ Of course, typicality is a strongly cultural notion. In China, for instance, the most typical vehicle could be a bicycle and the word *vehicle* might by default refer to a bicycle. We assume here that the determination of typicality in a language is mediated through the actual hierarchy of concepts which is culturally defined.

From *W*'s point of view, the Typicality Rule can be linked to Grice's Maxim of Quantity: "Be as informative as possible". If the vehicle in the scene is not a typical one, *W* should say so, or else he would be hiding an important piece of information, useful for *R* to interpret the text. The mild strangeness of (2) can be explained by this minor violation.

Associations between entities may also be more or less typical relative to a particular context, and these typical associations help resolve associative anaphors and metonymies. For instance, in (4 a.), knowing that there are gas pumps in a gas station allows *R* to link *the pump* to the gas station which is mentioned in the previous sentence. Similarly, we know that when a car door is smashed, someone must be responsible, which explains the definite article in (4 b.).

- (4) a. *I was entering (vehicle A) the lane into a gas station. The pump being out of order, I was backing up to leave when I hit vehicle B which had also entered the same lane to get gas.* (A17)
- b. *Having left my car to call a mechanic, I came back to find it with the right back door bashed in with no note left by the guilty party.* (A2)

Metonymy is a general linguistic device, i.e. part of LC, which is often used to allow the identification (*inter alia*) of a container with its content, and a common use of metonymy in our texts concerns the vehicle and its driver. Metonymy creates a unique discourse entity with properties coming from the elements being identified. A common use of metonymy in our texts concerns the vehicle and its driver. This metonymy allows transference of properties either from the driver to the car, e.g. intentionality in (5 a.) and agentivity in (5 b.), or from the car to its driver, as in (6 a.) where objects (here the bumper) belonging to the vehicle are treated as belonging to the driver, or (6 b.) where the property of "rolling along" (the literal meaning of the verb *rouler*) is transferred to the driver.⁴

This use of metonymy follows the coercion of semantic types (see [Pustejovsky, 1989b]) in a predictable way: the properties being used to make an entity of one type (e.g. *car*: "inanimate mechanical object") into an entity of another type (e.g. *driver*: "human agent") are extractible in a regular way from the predicate (e.g. *squeeze*: "requires an agentive subject"). We show in section 3.3 below the role played by metonymy in argumentation.

- (5) a. *Vehicle B seemed to want to let vehicle A go through,* (B42)

⁴ We can note that the use of this metonymy is not symmetrical: the other protagonist is often only perceived through his car (i.e. car- > driver), while the writer sees his car as an extension of himself (i.e. driver- > car).

- b. *Being momentarily stopped in the right lane on Boulevard des Italiens, I had switched my blinker on; I was at a stop and getting ready to change lanes. Vehicle B coming from my left squeezed too close to me and damaged the whole left front side.* (A7)

- (6) a. *my bumper* (A11)
- b. *Je roulais* (*I was driving*, literally *I was rolling*)

3.1.3 Spatial and physical knowledge

As part of K-context, the knowledge of a number of spatial or physical facts (cinematics, dynamics, etc.) is required to understand what happens in a text about road accidents. For example, in (2), *R* must be able to conclude that vehicle B is to the right of vehicle A. The reasoning is obvious: swerving to avoid a car door on the left can only be done with any plausibility towards the right. Nevertheless, for an automatic treatment of such inferences, we must give all the rules needed for reconstructing this natural reasoning. [Gayral, 1992] and [Gayral et al., 1994] attempt to provide such a model, based on naive physics.

In the case of text (3), *R* will deduce without any difficulty that vehicle B was driving too fast when it entered the curve and that this excessive speed was the cause of it being thrown off course. But this excessive speed is only mentioned in the second sentence of the text, and there is no linguistic motivation for associating it with the previous event *arriving in front of me in the curve* described in the first sentence. However, this is what K-context allows *R* to do. On the one hand, when a vehicle is *thrown off course*, some typical reasons such as a slippery road, high speed, or a mechanical incident come to mind; these can include a curve linked with high speed. On the other hand, when a vehicle is "thrown off course in a curve" one usually does not speed up but rather brakes. So, in (3), since the vehicle had an excessive speed after being thrown off course, it would necessarily have had this high speed before being thrown off course.

3.2 F-context

3.2.1 Parameter "Accident"

In many of our texts, the accident is explicitly mentioned with verbs such as *percuter*, *endommager*, *toucher*, *heurter* ("collide", "damage", "touch", "hit"), or with nouns such as *choc*, *collision* ("impact", "collision"). Interestingly, the word *accident* itself almost never occurs, and the accident is evoked with some more or less complex paraphrase. This aspect of the texts is linked to E-context and the argumentative component in an accident report. The writers use circumlocutions to emphasize the idea that the accident happened **in spite**

of all their efforts to avoid it. One of the best examples is (7):

(7) *We certainly got closer and consequently hit each other, her car getting stuck into mine, its left fender into the right front side of my car.* (A17)

But this is not the case in (8), a text for which, if it was another type of narrative, we might imagine other endings to the incident (e.g. *but I was able to swerve and avoid it*).

(8) *We were in Saint-Ouen, I was surprised by the person who braked in front of me, not being able to change lanes, and the road being wet, I couldn't stop completely in time* (A15)

We can see here the effect of the “Accident” parameter: since these texts are accident reports, the series of events they relate must by default contain an accident. The interpretation of the texts often requires the reconstruction of an impact between the two vehicles, as in (8), where the incident which is described would not otherwise warrant the existence of the report. We will see more instance of this in section 3.3, where we look at its argumentative effect.

The existence of the impact can then be deduced from a combination of several clues, some linguistic, some inferential. Among the former, we often find the combination of the negation with a verbal group of the form “can/be able to + V”, for instance *I couldn't stop completely in time* in (8), or *I wasn't able to avoid the car which was coming with great speed* in (3).

3.2.2 Parameter “Participants”

The fact that car accidents usually involve two participants, most often two vehicles, is used to infer the identity of some entities in the texts or to establish coreference between two entities.

A specific naming convention in French insurance claim reports for the vehicles involved in an accident is that claimants must refer to their own vehicle and to their opponent's as A or B. This convention arises from the pre-defined format of the claim report, on which each of the two drivers must first answer a set of questions by checking boxes in one of two columns A or B, thus choosing for themselves one of the roles. They usually then continue to use these labels for themselves and their opponent in the free-running text, but not necessarily in the whole text. Indeed the authors often mix first person expressions with these neutral third person labels.

From *R*'s point of view, resolving the problem of reference, i.e. identifying the different vehicles involved in the accident and their drivers, often requires knowledge of F-context, particularly of the “Participants” parameter. We now look at several examples where knowing that there are two vehicles involved in the scene of the accident helps resolve anaphors.

(9) *I was going down towards Bellefontaine. The road is a narrow, windy road, lined with trees. In a curve with not much visibility, we collided.* (B33)

The pronoun *we* in (9) refers to the two vehicles involved in the accident, although the opponent's vehicle is not mentioned (the writer's vehicle is implicit in *I was going down*). This anaphor can only be resolved because of the F-context “Participants” parameter. Without the context that there should be two vehicles involved, the pronoun *we* would be surprising and probably uninterpretable.

(10) *Vehicle A waiting and stopped at the Pont de Levallois lights. Vehicle B arrived and hit my left side mirror with its right side mirror.* (C10)

The first proposition in (10) introduces vehicle A, i.e. one of the two vehicles involved in the accident. The second proposition introduces vehicle B, i.e. the other vehicle involved in the accident. In the third proposition, the reader encounters *my left side mirror*.⁵ If *R* did not know the convention, this expression would force the introduction of a third vehicle, which would have to be *W*'s because of the *my*. Indeed, without the knowledge that *W*'s vehicle is named A or B, there is no reason to identify vehicle A with it, even if vehicle A's role in the scene is then rather unclear. However, with the knowledge of this convention, coreference can be resolved.

Another example is (11), where vehicle B is mentioned in the first sentence and the second vehicle involved in the accident is mentioned in the second sentence.

(11) *Coming back home, the driver of vehicle B in front of me lost control of his vehicle because of sudden icing. In turn I couldn't control my vehicle which after 20 meters crashed into Mrs. Louvet's vehicle. I want to stress that there was no ice anywhere else and we were many vehicles skidding on this street. Nothing could allow foreseeing such icing conditions.* (B28)

The relative clause in the second sentence refers to an accident between Mrs. Louvet's vehicle and *W*'s. Nothing, except F-context, warrants linking vehicle B and Mrs. Louvet's, and at first glance, there could appear to be three vehicles in this scene. However, because of the F-context “Participants” parameter, and because the text says that the accident takes place between *W*'s vehicle and vehicle B, the reader can deduce that Mrs. Louvet is the driver of vehicle B and that there are only two vehicles involved.

⁵The use of the metonymy in the expression *my left side mirror* reinforces the sense of hesitation about reference which we observe in our texts.

3.3 E-context

When setting to the task of writing such a report, *W* knows the “Short” parameter, the constraint that only about a paragraph (in a pre-defined area on the form) may be used to relate the accident. At the same time, *W* must not forget any important information whose absence would prevent *R* from reconstructing the correct factual content *P*, and he must thus be both **exhaustive** and **concise**.

On the other hand, the authors know that these few lines, meant for their insurance company, may contribute to the final decision about their share of legal and financial liability. They know that the intended readers, the insurance agents, must pass a judgement on their behavior and will determine their share of responsibility in the accident. Necessarily then, the authors of those reports attempt to present their case in the best possible light in order to minimize their responsibility.

In short, *W* is faced with what we call “*W*’s selection problem”, namely the constraint on the choice of information to give in order to satisfy the three goals: to be exhaustive, to be concise, and to lessen their responsibility.⁶

These goals are not contradictory and actually become intermingled. While describing the scene, *W* is trying to argue for his innocence. Thus, the choices of which elements are mentioned in the report can thus reveal an argumentative strategy while helping reconstruct the factual content of the text. The authors can choose to adopt a “legal” framework for describing the setting of the accident. They then try to speak the same language as the insurance agent and give exactly the information that the latter expects. They choose precise words to refer accurately to the objects which are present in this space seen from a legal point of view and which are directly relevant to traffic, e.g. road signs, markings, or referring to events happening in this domain also from a legal point of view, such as *turn his blinker on, coming from the left*, etc.

Since it invokes legal traffic rules, this information also evokes some particular behavior on the part of the drivers involved. Most of the time, however, the presentation given by *W* is not neutral but aims to prove either that his behavior was the one expected in the situation, or that his opponent’s behavior was wrong and unexpected, or even both at the same time. The argumentation may be explicit or left implicit. For instance, in (12), the first two sentences set up in a very detailed

⁶ This problem is part of the wider language conventions LC and constitutes a “meta-knowledge”, essential for the success of communication: the text *T* must provide all the information that is necessary in order to be understood or to convince, but only that much. This problem can be considered a particular instance of Grice’s Maxims [Grice, 1975], in particular the Maxim of Quantity, or of Ducrot’s exhaustivity law [Ducrot, 1972].

way a situation which is specifically controlled by traffic rules.

(12) *I was driving in my vehicle A in the right lane reserved for vehicles going straight ahead. Vehicle B was driving in the left lane reserved for vehicles going left (ground markings with arrows). It cut back in on my vehicle. (A12-markings)*

The presence of “ground markings with arrows” implies a particular behavior on the part of vehicles driving in that lane: they must go left. The last sentence exactly contradicts this expected behavior and is intended to prove that vehicle B made a mistake in “cutting back in” on *W*’s vehicle since it was not respecting the ground markings. Of course, *W* has taken care to mention that his own vehicle was in the correct lane.

In (13), *W* clearly refers to an important French traffic rule, namely that the right-of-way always belongs to the vehicle coming from the right. This right-of-way is implied in the first sentence: vehicle B arrived from the left at an intersection and should have let vehicle A go. Since an accident has occurred, *R* may then deduce B’s wrong behavior, which *W* then refers to explicitly at the end of the text. At the same time, *W* takes care to insist on his own correct behavior (*at moderate speed*).

(13) *Vehicle B coming from my left, I find myself at the intersection, at moderate speed, about 40 km/h, when vehicle B hits my vehicle, and denies me the right-of-way from the right. (A4)*

In (14), the first sentence indicates that the driver of vehicle B did something illegal, since passing a vehicle must, according to French traffic rules, be done on the left. The end of the text then reinforces B’s wrong behavior through the use of lexical elements such as *slalom* and *ran away*.

(14) *The driver of vehicle B passing me on the right caught my right front bumper and dragged me towards the movable wall on the Gennevilliers Bridge, which I violently smashed into. According to the witness who was following me, the driver of vehicle B was doing a slalom between the cars. After hitting me, he ran away and couldn’t be caught up with by the above-mentioned witness. (A11)*

The authors often express their own psychological states (e.g. *être surpris* “to be surprised” in (15)) or thoughts during the accident (*je ne m’attendais pas* “I didn’t expect” in (16)), although these are not a priori directly interesting for the insurance company.

(15) *I was surprised by the person who braked in front of me, not being able to change lanes, and the road being wet (A15)*

(16) *I didn't expect that a driver would wish to pass me for there weren't two lanes marked on the portion of the road where I was stopped.* (A5)

Mentioning them allows *W* to explain his behavior, particularly in establishing a contrast between what was expected and what happened in reality. *W* can claim not to have had any control over what was actually happening because that was a consequence of unforeseeable and/or uncontrollable circumstances: the road was wet in (17 b.), the pavement was slippery in (17 a.). Thus *W* cannot be considered as responsible for the accident.

(17) a. *on impact, and because of the slippery pavement, my vehicle skids, and hits the metal railing around a tree, whence a second front impact.* (A4)
 b. *and the road being wet, I wasn't able to stop completely in time.* (A15)

The very frequent use of negation is also a favorite clue to indicate implicitly an opposition between what should have happened and what actually occurred, for instance in (17 b.) and in (18). The use of negation can also be a way of not mentioning explicitly the collision (see section 3.2).

(18) *I wasn't able to avoid the car which was coming with great speed.* (A8)

Another argumentative device is the reverse of the metonymy conflating the vehicle and its driver which we saw in 3.1. For instance, in (17 a.), it is not *W*, but the car which is the subject of the two verbs, as if it was responsible for the events. Because they suppress the agent, reflexive verbs (*la porte s'est ouverte* “the door opened”) or the passive voice (*j'ai été déporté* “I was thrown off course”) instead of a plain active, are two contructions which also help suggest that *W* was not involved in the course of events and cannot be held responsible for what happened.

To summarize, the examination of the terms used and of the elements which the authors choose to mention in their texts reveals that there are two strategies they can follow to argue their case in the most persuasive way:

- A. Trying to push the blame onto the opponent by accusing him of abnormal behavior
- B. Contrasting what was expected and what happened in reality, by invoking unforeseeable circumstances.

With either strategy, *W* must first show that he has done everything that was required in the given circumstances and will always try to appear as blameless as possible. Of course the two strategies are not mutually exclusive as shown by (8) above. (19) is also an example of a mixture of both strategies, in which where *W* piles up all sorts of attenuating circumstances and also emphasizes (*immediately put the brakes on*) his own appropriate reactions.

(19) *I was driving at about 45 km/h in a small one-way street where cars were parked on both sides. Popping suddenly on my right coming out of a private building garage, Mrs. Glorieux's vehicle was at a very short distance from my vehicle; passage being impossible: surprised, I immediately put the brakes on but the impact was unavoidable.* (A14)

4 Inferences

In this section, we give evidence for the role which the knowledge of the argumentative function of such texts plays in the process of interpretation, particularly in the reconstruction of its factual content.

4.1 Lexical Ambiguity

As shown in (20), the original French text of the example given in (3) presents a an exemple of this kind of ambiguity, since in French, the word *droite* is ambiguous between the two interpretations *right* and *straight*.⁷

(20) *Je roulais sur la partie droite de la chaussée* (A8)
I was driving on the right-hand side / straight portion of the road

Here, even though the whole text can also be interpreted with the *straight* meaning, the *right* interpretation is more plausible. However, only an argumentative type of reasoning can lead *R* to prefer the latter. Since it is well-known to both *R* and *W* that in France one drives on the right, by specifying that he was driving on the *right* side of the road, *W* violates the Maxim of Quantity (i.e. not to say anything superfluous) and therefore must be taken as intending to convey some other information. In this case, it must be to assert that his behavior was conforming to the *Code de la route* (the “Rules of the Road”), which is indeed a pertinent fact to mention. Here, informational redundancy by itself carries some information which allows inference. We can thus formulate the rule that: “In case of ambiguity, *R* should prefer the interpretation from which correct behavior on *W*'s part can be inferred”.

4.1.1 Time Reference Ambiguity

In the first sentence of (5 b.), given in (21), the use of the pluperfect *had switched on* is ambiguous.

(21) *Being momentarily stopped in the right lane on Boulevard des Italiens, I had switched my blinker on; I was at a stop and getting ready to change lanes.* (A7)

⁷ If the adjective *droite* means *straight*, its opposite is then *courbe/curved*, if it means *right*, the opposite is then *gauche/left*.

The pluperfect implies that the process being talked about is perceived with another past event as a point of reference, which may not yet have been mentioned.⁸ Here, two different referential situations can be envisaged, with two different consequences:

- If the accident itself is chosen as the point of reference, switching the blinker on signals a future change of lanes. It must therefore be the left blinker. This conclusion requires geometrical reasoning: “If X is stopped in the right lane and if X wants to change lanes, X can only go left”.
- If the time of stopping is chosen as the point of reference, switching the blinker on is prior to the time of stopping and thus signals it. It must then be the right blinker, since the vehicle is in the right lane.

Arguments of the “Maxims” type must then be used. *R* cannot assume that too much information is present in the text. For the blinker to be switched on before stopping would not be relevant since the accident occurred after that of stopping, when *W* started again. On the other hand, the fact that *W* did switch his blinker on before starting again is very relevant from an argumentative point of view, since it means “*W* behaved in the right way and did what was required”. Therefore, by the rule proposed above, the first interpretation is chosen and *R* may conclude that *W* had his left blinker on.

4.1.2 Action or Intention?

Sometimes, the problem for *R* is to determine whether an action presented as an intended future event has remained at a purely intentional level or whether actions have already been taken to reach it. For instance, when the intended action belongs to a script with sequential steps, the question arises whether some of the preparatory actions belonging to the script have already been accomplished.

We have seen that there are two possible choices for a point of reference in the interpretation of the pluperfect in (21). In addition, the verb *s’apprêter à* can have several interpretations. Like *to get ready* (which we give here as its translation), it can mean *to be about to* and then it is a simple aspectual auxiliary focussing on the beginning of the action (inchoative). It can also have a more agentive interpretation and then it means *to actively prepare for*.

In the inchoative *to be about to* interpretation, the action of “switching the blinker on” is an event independent of “changing lanes”; in the agentive *to prepare for* interpretation, that same action corresponds to one of the preparatory acts. But more crucially, in the agentive interpretation, *W* may already have started changing lanes and then probably would be at fault, while in the inchoative reading, *W* would still be stopped and would be innocent.

⁸ The situation is exactly parallel in French and English.

It seems that in most of the cases we find in our texts, such an intended future event is more than simply intentional and that *W* has indeed already started to act. Otherwise it would not be possible to explain the accident in (21) ((5b.)), since there would be no reason for *W*’s car to have been damaged if *W* had not already started turning left.

Similarly in the case of the texts given in (22) and (23) below, the only plausible reconstruction of the accident requires vehicle A to have already started the action which is presented as an intention (*Wanting to pass a hauler* in (22) and *I wanted to enter the second lane* in (23)).

(22) *Wanting to pass a hauler with its right blinker on, the latter turned left, forcing me to steer left to avoid it. The car skidded on the wet pavement and struck a sidewalk then a fence straight ahead. The truck driver had indeed switched on his left blinker, but the trailer was inverting the signal to the right. Not having touched me, the driver declared himself unconcerned by the situation and refused to draw a report. Having left my car to call a mechanic, I came back to find it with the right back door bashed in with no note left by the guilty party.* (A2)

(23) *I was stopped at the intersection wishing to take the road on which the intense traffic is going one-way in two lanes; as the last vehicle of the flow was coming, I wanted to enter the second lane, leaving the first one free for it. The moment I started, I heard the shock in the back; I wasn’t expecting a driver would wish to pass me for there weren’t two lanes marked on the portion of the road where I was stopped.* (A5)

Instead of using an imperfective verbal form (i.e. *étant en train de dépasser un semi-remorque* (“while passing a hauler”) in (22), or *j’étais en train de tourner à gauche* (“I was turning left”) in (23)) which would clearly indicate that the action had already started, *W* chooses the intentional form and in doing so, creates an ambiguity for *R*: “Had *W* actually already done something or not?”. This lack of precision (or downright lie?) is intentional and allows *W* to try to lessen his responsibility. This will succeed if *R* opts for a purely intentional reading of the verbal form.

4.1.3 Argumentation-Based Inference

We said earlier that in (1) *R* could infer that, though this is not stated in the text, *W* probably wanted to turn right, but that discourse argumentation was required for this conclusion. Indeed, the script for going through stop-sign says that “If *X* wants to turn right at a stop-sign, *X* should check to the left; if *X* wants to turn left,

X should check to the left and to the right.”.

Since *W* does not mention checking to the right but only checking to the left, it means that *W* did not intend to turn left. If *W* was going to turn left, to mention checking to the right would be pertinent information for the insurance company since it would show that *W* had done everything required in such circumstances. In fact, it is the non-homogeneity of this discourse which suggests that *W* did turn left: either no check should be mentioned or if only one is mentioned, then *R* may infer that the other one was not required. In another line of argument, checking to the left is also mentioned by *W* in order to explain that, since he was looking to the left (and not straight ahead), he could not have seen that the other car had not turned right.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we address the general issue of “how to define context” and we have chosen an experimental rather than a theoretical approach to this question. By selecting real occurring texts, instead of texts written to illustrate particular phenomena, and an homogeneous corpus of texts written in similar circumstances, we were able to focus on the characteristic properties of this text type and thus to better define the notion of context.

We have tried to show the importance of situational, cultural and textual presuppositions from the point of view of both the writer and the reader. As this work constitutes a first step in the study of natural language semantics in the context of an NLP project, the approach adopted here is an attempt to automate the process of understanding these texts and deriving inferences from them. Some of the crucial issues in NLP are precisely how to define and describe the different types of knowledge involved in the processes of writing and reading texts, and how to establish rules which mimic the reasoning involved in these activities.

Here, we take advantage of the specificity of the texts—the authors narrate events leading to a car accident while trying to lessen their responsibility—to circumscribe the type of knowledge required and to give some rules of interpretation, valid for this type of text, in this type of context.

We have determined three types of context: K-context, the non-linguistic knowledge required for this domain, F-context, the more specific context of the events being narrated, and E-context, the discourse context for this text type. The interest of the corpus we have chosen lies in the fact that it contains texts which involve the same three types of contexts: K-context because they all deal with road traffic, F-context because they all deal with car accidents and E-context because they are all insurance claim reports.

We have shown the importance of E-context, in particular the crucial role played by the argumentation which the writer is known to be pursuing and which allows the

reader to make a number of inferences. These inferences then help him clarify the text and choose between competing interpretations.

It would be interesting to analyze the two corresponding texts, by two opponents reporting the same accident, in order to establish which part of the information is objectively factual and shared by both texts, and which part of the information is argumentatively biased, thus better distinguishing the subjective part of the two discourses. The omission of information, which we mentioned as one of the argumentative devices on the part of *W* and as a basis for inference on the part of *R*, would then become an even more important factor in the analysis. Very few such pairs of texts are available, but in the continuation of this project, we may try to do some further work based on those we have.

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